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The Inflationary Process in 
Prerevolutionary Iran 
ROBERT E. LOONEY 
In retrospect, the development of inflation in Iran, especially after 1973, 
together with the government's inability to stabilize the price level were un-
doubtedly major economic causes of the 1979 revolution. 
Inflation poses a grave threat to any political system. It does so because it 
succeeds in touching the lives of the ordinary citizens-not some, but all-to 
an extent that government development expenditures can rarely achieve. 
Whether it is hyperinflation or gradual increases in prices over time, the 
damage done to the individual and society is evident. By creating an at-
mosphere of insecurity and futility, by permitting wholesale economic in-
justice, and by giving rise to abject poverty, inflation makes for irrationality 
in politics that deeply affects the nature and effectiveness of subsequent 
stabilization measures .1 
As Green notes: 
In 1977 a variety of events throughout Iran helped to galvanize and radicalize opposition to the 
Shah. It is here that Iran·s crisis of participation gradually became transformed into a far more 
critical crisis of the system as a whole. Recognizing the. economic problems caused by the Fifth 
Five Year Plan as well as the accompanying social discord, the Shah removed Amir Abbas 
Hoveyda as Prime Minister and replaced him with Jamshid Amuzegar .... The choice of 
Amuzegar was not a wise one. Basically a technocrat, Amuzegar was ill-suited to improving the 
regime's relations with or image among the masses. Reportedly, one of his first moves was to 
eliminate government subsidies for the national religious sector. Having little time for niceties or 
patience with politics, he was far happier working on often abstruse development issues, sur-
rounded by his fellow technocrats and unaware of events in the wider social context. The state of 
the economy compelled him to mount an attack on growing inflation. Thus, Amuzegar was in 
the position of having to begin his tenure by announcing restrictions on credit. These restrictions 
led to a recession; a cutback on building and development programs; and an increase in 
unemployment, which affected large numbers of recent migrants to the cities. Urban unrest, 
always a problem for the regime, grew worse. 2 
The nature of Iranian inflation and the course of inflation-related 
variables therefore merit considerable attention. In the analysis below, par-
ticular emphasis is given to inflation in the 1970s, with an attempt made to 
identify the type and source of the inflation experienced. 
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While it is impossible to argue that inflation per se was a major factor in 
causing the Iranian revolution, my analysis indicates that the Iranian 
government's mistaken perception of the nature of the post-1973 inflation 
resulted in the inability of its stabilization programs to stop the post-1973 
rise in prices. At the same time the harshness of the government's anti-
inflationary measures, together with their ineffectual results, sowed the 
seeds of distrust and resentment in wide segments of the population, creating 
an atmosphere easily played upon by the regime's enemies. 
Inflationary Pressures-Overview 
The Iranian economy enjoyed a prolonged period of price stability 
through the 1960s. Beginning in 1972, however, growing inflationary 
pressures developed and were present throughout the rest of the 1970s. Dur-
ing the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1968-1972), the annual rates of increase in 
the average level of consumer prices were low, ranging from 1 to 6 percent. 
The corresponding rates of inflation for the Fifth Plan (1973-1977) were, on 
the other hand, all in excess of 10 percent, amounting to as much as 27 per-
cent in 1977. 
A comparison of the rate of increase in the money supply (see table 1) and 
that of the major inflation indexes suggests that in the post-1973 period, the 
Iranian economy had advanced beyond its absorptive capacity in the sense of 
finding the complementary factors of production (such as human skills, 
natural resources, and infrastructure) to be put to work alongside the rapid 
increase in financial resources. Apparently, injections of oil revenues beyond 
a certain level-that level being the annual absorptive capacity-only led to 
higher inflationary pressures, with little or no corresponding increase in out-
put resulting from this expenditure. 
The evidence for Iran during the post-1972 period suggests a tendency of 
trying to do too much in too short a time. 3 The problem was aggravated by 
the jump in international inflation rates during 1973-1974. Yet it would be a 
mistake to suggest that the observed rates of domestic inflation were due to 
purely international factors. On the contrary, most studies on the subject in-
dicate that, in general, international price increases contributed no more 
than 25 percent to domestic inflation in developing countries, leaving a 
substantial portion to be accounted for by domestic factors. 
Most domestic sources of inflationary pressures built up in the mid-1970s 
can be traced to the decision to revise the Fifth Five-Year Plan following the 
oil price increases. At that time, total investment projected for the duration 
of the plan was doubled and vast amounts allocated to social welfare and 
subsidy programs. Within the framework of the Fifth Plan, the government's 
expenditures for 1974 were triple those in 1973. From the total government 
budget for 1974 (Rl,254 billion), only 28 percent went into fixed capital for-
mation, whereas 58 percent was spent on current expenditures. 
This unprecedented expansion in government expenditures created a cor-
responding expansion of liquidity. The result was a rapid increase in effec-
tive demand. One net impact of the government's fiscal actions was the crea-
tion of an economic environment whereby producers were encouraged to 
make the utmost use of their means of production. Another consequence was 
that traders responded quickly to increase imports to balance supply with 
demand. As a result, the demand for means of production and for primary 
and intermediate goods increased, while simultaneously the available 
TABLE l 
IJIAN: GROWTH OF MONETARY AGGREGATES: MEASURES OF INFLATION 
(Average Annual Rate) 
Ml M2 M3 M4 CPI WPI GDPDF 
1960 11.50 ..... ..... ..... 10.04 3.15 3.04 
1961 -16.73 . ... . ..... . .... 3.17 1.28 2.14 
1962 22.72 24.94 ..... . .... 0.72 1.27 -0.26 
1963 12.96 16.22 ... .. ..... 0.17 0.18 0.79 
1964 10.98 13.81 . . . . . ..... 4.11 4.64 1.83 
1965 12.87 13.01 13.30 13.09 2.06 3.33 -2.31 
1966 10.07 12.48 13.83 11.19 -0.34 -1.18 -0.52 
1967 14.92 16.07 16.48 16.35 1.52 0.17 -0.79 
1968 7.86 13.43 12.09 14.89 0.67 0.66 0.53 
= 1969 6.07 15.07 14.76 17.94 3.64 2.61 0.52 :!:I .. 
1970 12.78 15.23 16.36 19.06 1.59 2.84 0.52 g. :s 
.. 
1971 17.17 19.36 19.82 18.33 4.24 5.79 7.27 ~ 
1972 27.71 26.07 26.89 21.28 6.49 5.46 6.78 f . 1973 22.93 23.25 24.93 25.35 9.76 10.11 31.79 
1974 27.09 29.97 36.11 37.27 
:;· 
14.30 14.47 55.67 ~ 
1975 16.76 25.79 21.59 25.09 "' 12.74 7.40 10.38 ~
< 
1976 44.25 44.88 42.53 42.34 11.29 8.26 16.90 0 fr 





SouRCE: Computed from Bank Markazi Iran, Annual Report, 1970, 1975, 1977; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Year- '< 
book, 1980. ... .. 
NOTE: Ml, M2, M3, and M4 = various measures of the money supply; CPI = Consumer price index; WPI =Wholesale price index; and GDPDF = :s 
Gross domestic product deflator. 
c.> 
~ 
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infrastructural facilities were used at maximum capacity. Due, however, to 
the general shortage of skilled workers and infrastructure capacity in certain 
key areas, the supply of domestically produced goods could not increase at 
the same rate as the demand. Therefore, inflationary pressures mounted, 
while at the same time the feedback of the oil price increases-an accelera-
tion in world inflation-resulted in increased import prices. 
Initially, the greatest inflationary pressures were concentrated in the con-
struction and housing sectors. Both the rflpid growth in incomes and the in-
creasing migration from rural to urban areas played an important role in 
creating shortages not only of available living quarters but also of construc-
tion materials (a condition that was already evident prior to the Fifth 
Development Plan). The result was a sharp escalation in the price of land, 
construction materials, and wages of construction workers. In turn, the ac-
celeration of inflation in the construction and housing sectors spilled over to 
other sectors, finally increasing inflationary pressures in all other activities 
of the economy. 
As bottlenecks began to develop, the time lag in converting financial 
capital into productive capital lengthened, further impeding the adjustment 
of supply to demand, with increased shortages of materials and skilled labor. 
Many projects, both public and private, were not completed despite the fact 
that in many cases the budgets for these projects were actually spent. At the 
same time, a considerable volume of goods ordered from abroad did not ar-
rive on time. As a result of these factors, aggregate supply was never able to 
catch up with aggregate demand during the Fifth Plan, the adjustment be-
tween demand and supply taking place instead through price increases. 
The overspending of financial resources not only represented a loss in real 
resources with inte1:temporal implications, but also set in motion a series of 
inflationary pressures that were difficult to halt without eventually resorting 
to fairly drastic restrictive measures. The amount of real resources lost-real 
in the sense that they represented an equivalent in exported barrels of 
oil-were resources that could have been used in the future to expand the 
country's productive capacity at such a time when the relationship between 
the economy's annual financial inflow and annual absorptive capacity 
would permit it. When used in the present, as was the case, these resources 
were simply dissipated in the form of higher prices. 
Theories of Inflation 
While few would argue in principle with the broad interpretation of Ira-
nian inflation outlined above, its high level of generality makes it of 
somewhat limited use in evaluating the effectiveness of the government's 
anti-inflation programs. 
The increase in the rate of inflation in the first half of the 1970s, together 
with the government's seeming inability to stabilize the price level, indicates 
the need for a deeper understanding of the country's inflationary process. 
Something of a debate concerning the precise cause of the rapidly ac-
celerating price level transpired during this periqd. For convenience, two ex-
treme views of the country's inflationary process can be distinguished: the 
monetarist interpretation and the structuralist explanation. 
The Monetarist Position. The monetarist view on inflation in Iran can be 
gleaned from the various statements made over the years in the Bank 
Markazi Iran Annual Reports. Nearly every year after 1970, the bank made 
Inflationary Process in Prerevolutionary Iran 333 
some statement to the effect that inflation in the country was a problem of 
excess monetary demand. Typical of the bank's approach was the implicit 
application of Fisher's version of the quantity theory of money; for example, 
in 1975 the bank noted that 
during recent years, due to the very speedy growth of income the total demand increased at a 
higher rate than total supply of goods and services. This situation not only resulted in creating 
new difficulties for the economy, but also increased inflationary pressures. During recent years, 
especially in 1973, due to the expansionary financial activities of the Government and the speedy 
growth of credits extended by the private sector, the money supply .and consequently the effective 
demand increased at a much higher rate than could ge accommodated by domestic production.• 
We find in their reports, therefore, that the bank accepted a model that 
usually implicitly but sometimes explicitly linked inflation with monetary 
factors. Furthermore, a careful reading of the bank's reports leads one to 
conclude that its senior economists tended to view the economy as one where 
aggregate demand was determined by factors associated with Fisher's ver-
sion of the quantity theory of money. 5 Specifically, in recommending 
policies designed to assure monetary stability, the bank implicitly assumed 
that the economy's prices and wages were, for the most part, flexible. 
Stabilization measures suggested by the bank at one time or another includ-
ed restrictive monetary policies, restrictions on government expenditures 
(mainly government consumption expenditures), reduction of imports con-
trols, and lower wage and salary adjustments (presumably limited to less 
than the previous year's inflation rate). 
Nowhere in the bank's analysis of the country's inflation is there any 
evidence that its officials felt that the underlying structure of the economy 
prevented high and steady rates of economic growth with price stability, 
provided the proper monetary and fiscal policies were implemented. 
The Structuralist Position. Structuralism was associated from the begin-
ning with the more <leftist Iranian writers together with a number of the 
leading technocrats in the plan organization. 6 As developed in Iran, struc-
turalism was concerned largely with the examination of potential and actual 
conflicts between growth, stabilization, and· equity. 
Structuralist emphasis was always on disequilibrium and the notion that 
the country's inflation was inevitable once the government attempted rapid 
growth in the presence of structural bottlenecks or constraints. Their chief 
assumption was therefore that certain fundamental facets of the economic, 
institutional, and sociopolitical organization of the country in one way or 
another acted to inhibit economic expansion. 
The structuralist analysis was concerned largely with the identification 
and examination of alleged structural constraints. 7 While not always spelled 
out, these could be taken to include the inelastic supply of foodstuffs, the in-
frastructure bottleneck, and the savings constraint. 
In the structuralist view, inflation could not be stopped if these structural 
limitations were not eliminated. The cumulative inflationary pressures were 
distortions generated by the inflationary process itself, distortions which 
were in turn an increasing function of the rate of inflation. The important 
cumulative factors were distortions of the price system, mainly caused by the 
price-control policies associated with inflatio~ and misallocation of 
resources, especially investment funds. 
One version of structuralist thought contended that inflation was in-
evitable, given the country's phase of transition from an outward-oriented, 
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export-based economy to an inward-oriented, domestic market-based 
economy. 8 Such a transition, it was argued, required massive changes in the 
socioeconomic structure of the country that the price mechanisms, operating 
within very imperfect market structures and with limited resource mobility, 
were unable to achieve; i.e., given the imperfection of the system, the result 
of attempting major structural change was simply shortages and the disequi-
librium on many fronts. 
For example, urbanization and rising incomes led to a rapidly rising de-
mand for foodstuffs that could not be met by the agricultural sector. The 
supply response of the agricultural sector was low because of the structural 
constraints within that sector-the domination either by small firms 
operating at a near subsistence level and barely integrated into the larger 
market economy or larger foreign-dominated business that had not been 
able to adapt to the Iranian conditions for one reason or another. 
The basic position of the structuralists was, therefore, that agricultural 
production failures could not be attributed to market demand and/or price 
conditions, but instead had to be the direct result of factors inherent in the 
institutional and economic organization of the agrarian sector itself. 
Quantitative Assessment of Inflationary Mechanisms 
The structuralist approach is largely of interest because it provides a 
useful framework for developing an integrated view of the country's infla-
tionary process. Realistically, however, because it relies on such concepts as 
relative inelasticity (how inelastic does something have to be before it is 
relatively inelastic?), the theory is not directly amenable to empirical 
testing. Several indirect tests are possible, however, and are undertaken 
below. 
It should be noted, however, that any analysis of Iranian inflation will 
suffer from the limited availability of data, and the existing data's limita-
tions. There is no consistent time series for wages, nor is there an import 
price series. Further the GDP deflator is so weighted by oil that it is of little 
value in analyzing the possible determinants of domestic price increases. 
There is a cost of living index and a wholesale price index, but both of 
these measures are subject to serious defects; for instance, the cost of living 
index is based on a limited sample of goods and services purchased in the ma-
jor urban areas and is, therefore, unrepresentative of the consumption pat-
terns of the majority of the rural population, while the wholesale price index 
is heavily weighted with imports. 
Given the data, I will examine two cost factors-world prices and 
wages-and two structuralist elements-the presence of bottlenecks and the 
effects of deviations from the trend in real nonoil GDP on prices. 
Movements in World Prices 
Given its size, it is safe to assume that Iran's purchases and sales of nonoil 
goods in the world market had no effect on the prices of these goods; i.e., for 
all practical purposes, the prices of the cottntry's nonoil exports and imports 
were determined by global demand and supply conditions. For purposes of 
analysis, therefore, the U.S. dollar export and import prices in rials were 
dependent on the officially determined rial/dollar rate. 
There are two channels by which rising import prices might induce do-
mestic inflation: the direct effect due to rising prices in world markets, and 
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an indirect effect transmitted through the higher cost of domestic production 
of finished products that stems from increases in the prices of imported raw 
materials. In terms of the second channel, the degree to which Iranian pro-
ducers had little or no way of substituting for imported materials meant that 
there were few real possibilities (at least in modern industries) of switching 
from expensive imported goods to cheaper domestic sources of supply. 
The data on external sources of inflation for this period are somewhat 
limited. Nevertheless, several patterns seem fairly clear. Expenditure on 
merchandise imports averaged from.12 to 15 percent of aggregate expen-
diture on GDP between 1970 and 1974; the proportion rose to nearly 20 per-
cent in 1975. Nearly the same proportion was maintained in 1976. The great 
increase in imports in 1975 was undoubtedly a significant factor in dampen-
ing the inflationary pressures caused by excess demand. On the other hand, 
it is likely that the increase in import prices beginning in 1972 had an infla-
tionary impact through the cost structure of firms. 
Import-induced cost-push pressures are a real possibility since, prior to 
1975 and 1976, intermediate goods accounted for more than 60 percent of 
total imports. By far the greatest proportion of intermediate imports were 
for manufacturing. Another 20 to 30 percent of imports were capital goods. 
The remaining 12 or 13 percent (rising to about 17 percent in 1975 and 1976) 
were consumer goods. Clearly, a great potential existed for increases in im-
port prices to have significantly affected the domestic price structure and 
level. Of course, increased prices of consumer-goods imports acted directly 
on the consumer price level (depending upon the relative importance of im-
ported food and other consumption items in total consumption). 
During this period, a number of important food items, such as cereals, 
sugar, and meat, all experienced exceptionally large domestic price increases 
resulting in dramatic growth in their importation. Sugar imports, for exam-
ple, rose from a small proportion of the total supply in the early 1970s to 
nearly one-third by 1975. Imports of cereals varied considerably from crop 
to crop and from year to year, depending on the harvest. Rice and wheat im-
ports, for example, averaged about one-third of total supply each, while im-
ports of barley and maize accounted for about one-eighth and four-fifths, 
respectively, of total supplies. Clearly (except for meat), the size of these im-
port shares indicates that increased world prices would have had a signifi-
cant effect upon domestic prices. By 1974 or 1975, meat imports had grown 
to the point where increases in the world price were also likely to have a 
significant impact on domestic prices. 
Consumers were, as noted before, buffered somewhat from world price 
increases for cereals, meat, dairy products, sugar, and fruit through an ex-
tensive government subsidy program. Government subsidies for these prod-
ucts rose to $1,000 million annually from 1974 to 1976, thus aiding signif-
icantly in reducing the rate of consumer price increases for these products to 
levels considerably below those in international markets. The subsidy pro-
gram makes any general assessment of world price increases on Iranian 
prices extremely difficult. It is possible to arrive at several tentative conclu-
sions, however, through examining the tre'1d in wholesale prices for im-
ported goods and those for domestic goods. For example, it appears that im-
port prices had their greatest impact on the domestic price level in 1972 and 
1973, the years in which import prices clearly led the rise in general 
wholesale prices. The introduction of the subsidy programs in 1974 and the 
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decline in international prices of food and raw materials in 1975 make fur-
ther conclusions quite difficult. 
Also, given available data, it is very difficult to make any clear distinction 
between external and internal sources of inflationary pressure for in-
termediate inputs into manufacturing and construction. There is clearly a 
relationship, however, between the import price of building materials, the 
rise in domestic wholesale prices, and the increase in the cost of housing and 
housing rentals. A similar pattern between import and domestic prices can 
be observed for textiles. For all these items, it is apparent that both domestic 
and foreign sources of price increases contributed to the rise in Iranian 
wholesale and consumer prices. The domestic component of inflationary 
pressures corresponded generally in its timing to the expansion of consumer 
incomes, and for building materials to the rapid expansion of expenditures in 
the construction sector. 
In general, one can conclude that because Iran's terms of trade improved 
dramatically, especially relative to many developing countries, and because 
of the rapid rise in domestic prices after the oil price increases, it was only 
logical for the authorities to have increased imports as a means of reducing 
inflationary pressures. 
In fact, recent empirical work on a large sample of countries suggests that 
there may be a possible relationship between the degree of national integra-
tion into the world economic system and inflation; for example, in general 
the more open countries have experienced less price inflation. 9 Presumably 
openness serves as a kind of safety valve; domestic inflationary pressure spills 
over into the balance of payments in the open economy, thus necessitating 
less price inflation. 
One way of asstt>sing the effect of openness on domestic inflation is to test 
various formulations of a price equation, with measures reflecting the degree 
of contact with the world economy included as independent variables. 
Logical candidates in this regard are the oountry's import-income ratio, the 
rate of change in Iran's import-income rate, the country's terms of trade 
(ratio of import prices to export prices), the rate of growth of the Iranian 
money supply, and the rate of growth of Iran's real nonoil GDP. 
lyoha, the originator of this test, used imports/GDP as an independent 
variable. 10 He hypothesized that a negative correlation between these two 
variables could be interpreted as evidence in support of the hypothesis that 
in an open economy, domestic inflationary pressures spill over into the 
balance of payments, thus resulting in less domestic inflation than would 
otherwise have been the case. 
It has been argued that this mechanism is not a very accurate depiction of 
the mechanisms at work in most developing countries where foreign-
exchange shortages pose a severe limit to the possibility of absorbing poten-
tial inflationary pressures through increasing import surplus." The typical 
developing country may therefore not really have a choice between its rate 
of domestic inflation and its magnitude of balance of payments deficit; for 
instance, the rate of inflation may in part be.determined by the foreign-
exchange constraint. Iran's oil revenues and borrowing capacity, however, 
would seem to rule out this problem for most of the period under considera-
tion. 
Since there is no real consensus in the literature as to the best way of 
measuring "openness," I tried several formulations. All use the symbol Z and 
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are ratios to some measure of domestic production. Hence: 




vided by real nonoil income (or ZN/NOXNP) 
ZN/DOMEST, where DOMEST = nominal agriculture 
+ manufacturing value added 
agricultural imports/NOXN 
consumer imports/NOXN 
Terms with an "L" at the end indicate the value lagged one year (see 
tables 2 and 3). 
Other independent variables included in the analysis were the deviation of 
real nonoil GDP from its historical trend DTNOXPL, the rate of change in 
the export price index of industrialized countries (WINF), the growth of M2 
money (GM2), the growth in real nonoil GDP (GNOXNP), and the terms of 
trade (TTC). 
A number of different combinations were tried, with the best results oc-
curring when the various measures of openness were regressed simultaneous-
ly with some measure of excess demand-such as DTNOXP or GM!, 
GM2-and the rate of import price increases (WINF). Regressions on the 
consumer price increase gave consistently better but quite similar results to 
those of the wholesale price index. Hence, only the results obtained from the 
regressions with the rate of change in consumer prices are presented (see 
tables 2 and 3). 
In all cases, the value of Z (and L) is significant and has the expected 
negative sign. Caution should be observed in attributing great significance 
to the results, however. In several cases the t-statistic for the Z measure is on-
ly slightly significant at the 95 percent level. Also, it should be noted that 
when only Z (equation 1, table 2) was regressed on inflation (INFC), its sign 
was positive. The change in signs may simply be a problem related to cor-
relation between the independent variables. 
A plausible explanation of the positive relationship between Z and the rate 
of inflation is that a substantial portion of imports during this period were 
required for industrialization; for example, they did not represent a spillover 
effect "proper" from the domestic inflation. This type of import may have 
increased over time independent of changes in domestic prices. When world 
prices (WINF) together with a capacity constraint (DTNOXND) were added 
to the regressions to take part of this effect into account, the Z term always 
became strongly negative. A possible explanation for this result is that, on 
the margin, additional imports did in fact represent spillover imports to an 
extent great enough to overcome the positive effect of the price-inelastic 
imports. 
Wage Increases 
A second potential source of cost pressures during this period came from 
wage increases reflective of manpower shortages. Manpower shortages 
emerged as one of the most critical long-teirm problems confronting the 
government's development aspirations. In fact, in 1976 the Ministry of 
Labor estimated the country's manpower shortage for that year at roughly 
600,000. Previous estimates made in 1975 projected shortages of 3,740 




TABLE 2 ~ 0 
IJIAN, 1'EsT OF OPENNESS AND INFLATION [ 
DEPENDENT INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ~ 
EQUATION VARIABLE z CMIL ZL CM2 CNO~PL DTNOXPL WINFUI WINF 1TC INTERCEPT r• F r g 
(1) INFC 21.28 " .. 
'< 
(6.05) 0.769 36.60 
(2) INFC 10.22 0.44 
(2.96) (4.19) .916 54.61 
(3) INFC 22.41 -2.51 -2.00 
(2.06) ( -0.21) ( - 1.05) .753 16.78 
(4) INFC 20.30 -0.16 0.79 
(7.79) (-3.00) (0.A7) .864 34.82 
(5) INFC 12.90 0.89 -7.96 
(2.93) (2.23) (-2.58) .829 26.82 
(6) INFC -21.70 0.o7 9.38 
(-4.28) (8.98) (6.71) .959 128.39 
(7) INFG -32.58 0.08 0.35 11.11 
(-5.06) (10.62) (2.28) (7.87) .973 119.92 
(8) INFC -10.14 0.05 0.35 5.12 
(-2.17) (6.60) (3.95) (3.58) .957 75.92 
0.42 -0.009 
(2.27) (-5.09) 0.787 18.55 
NOTE, Z = nominal imports/real nonoil GDP; GMlL = the growth of Ml money lagged one year; ZL - Z lagged one year; GM2 = the growth in M2 
money; GNOXNPL = the growth in real nonoil GDP lagged one year; DTNOXPL = deviation from the logarithmic trend of real noooil GDP (1959-1977) 
lagged one year; WINF2 = import price inflation lagged two years; WINF = import price inflation; TIC = world price index divided by GDP deflator. 
TABLE3 
OPENNESS AND INFLATION IN IRAN 
DEPENDENT INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
EQUATION VARIABLE DTNOXPL WINF CM2L z WINFL2 ZL INFCL zx zz ZACL INTERCEPT rt F 
(1) INFC 0.036 0.31 1.90 
(11.88) (3.38) (2.42) 0.949 94.00 
(2) INFC 0.023 0.23 0.31 -2.61 
(2.32) (2.16) (1.48) (-0.83) .959 70.94 
(3) INFC 0.050 0.36 -8.59 4.37 
(6.25) (4.11) (-1.79) (2.81) .963 77.51 
(4) INFC 0.o78 0.35 -33.32 11.36 
(10.06) (2.21) (-4.84) (7.27) .973 109.15 
(5) INFC 0.047 0.42 -0.52 3.09 
(10.73) (5.27) (-2.88) (4.25) .974 lll.11 ;' 
(6) INFC 0.072 -22.2 9.57 :::i .. 
(8.47) (-4.02) (6.08) .959 116.29 g. 
:I 
(7) INFC 0.044 0.38 -15.49 5.29 .. ~ 
(8.69) (4.10) (-1.76) (2.57) .962 76.88 
"" a
(8) INFC 0.045 0.37 -5.39 4.93 ~ (7.00) (4.20) ( -1.87) (2.79) .964 79.43 ;· 
. 
(9) INFC 0.062 0.22 -17.ll 6.98 "" ~ (10.39) (3.86) (-4.50) (5.73) .985 190.25 ... ~ 
(10) INFC 0.042: -64.34 8.07 0 [ 
(12.43) (-2.80) (4.70) .940 77.65 0 
:I 
(11) INFC 0.039 0.22 -35.59 4.85 .. ~ 








340 Robert E. Looney 
semiskilled workers. At this time the ministry suggested that up to 700,000 
foreign workers might have to be recruited if the Fifth Plan targets were to 
be met. 12 
Instead, it appears a much more selective foreign-labor program was 
adopted. Foreign workers were concentrated in several areas with, for ex-
ample, a substantial number of foreign technicians (mainly Americans) 
recruited to keep the country's armed forces operational. Doctors from India 
were actively sought because of their .willingness to work for lower wages 
than their Iranian counterparts and in parts of the country where Iranians 
would not practice because of the climate or the lack of amenities. As with 
Saudi Arabia, a substantial number of South Koreans, Pakistanis, and other 
Asians were recruited for construction work. While a larger number of 
foreigners were recruited by the government, there seems to have been much 
less willingness than in Saudi Arabia's case to resort to the mass importation 
of foreign workers as a means of overcoming labor shortages. All in all, 
however, at the peak of labor immigration, only around 35,000 foreign 
workers were in the country. This was forecast to increase to 55,000 by the 
late 1970s. Also present in 1975-1976 were 15,000-20,000 temporary foreign 
consultants. 13 
For industry, one of the more obvious effects of labor shortages was the 
fast increase in wages as companies competed for the more highly skilled 
workers. Official figures list average wage increases of around 35 percent for 
1977. For that year, construction wage increases were officially placed at 48 
percent. Nevertheless, numerous accounts in the business-financial press 
support the argument that increases in the 60-70 percent range were quite 
common. 14 
The rapid expansion of the Iranian economy during this period was ac-
companied by generally expanding employment in manufacturing and con-
struction (although the slackening of activity in 1975 brought relatively 
minor decreases in employment in manufacturing and mining and in con-
struction activities). The overall rate of expansion in employment exceeded 3 
percent per year (again except for 1975), and increased levels of investment 
and expanding output levels resulted in significant increases in real output 
per worker .15 
It is easy to see how the combination of rapid increases in employment, in-
creasing real output per head, labor shortages, and (especially from 1973) 
rapid rates of inflation would be conducive to increases in wages and earn-
ings, certainly in nominal terms and possibly in real terms as well. Given the 
relatively free market system for most sectors of the Iranian economy at this 
time, one would predict that the most rapid increases in wages and earnings 
would occur in the sectors and industries in which employment was expand-
ing most rapidly. Similarly, jobs requiring relatively higher levels of skill, 
given the relative shortage of trained manpower, should also have induced 
wage increases. Various accounts suggest that these were indeed the patterns 
predominating in the country's labor markets, where numerous accounts ex-
ist attesting to the hindrance, to growth posed by shortages of skilled labor. 16 
Although the data for selected (large-scale) manufacturing industries are 
generally compatible with the overall sectoral figures (see table 4), it would 
appear that employment in the former group expanded rather more rapidly 
than the latter. Moreover, employment for the selected industries (which ac-
counted for about 7 percent of total employment in manufacturing and 
TABLE 4 
IRAN: EMPLOYMENT, EARNINGS, AND LABOR CosT IN MANUFACTURING AND CoNSTRUCTION 
(1970 = 100.0) 
1350 1351 1352 1353 1354 135.5 1356 1357 
(1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) 
Manufacturing and mfning 
Value added (constant prices) 116.8 138.7 162.l 191.7 224.2 
Employment 105.2 Ill.I 118.8 127.6 125.3 
Value added per employee (l + 3) 111.l 124.0 '. 136.5 150.2 179.0 
Selected manufacturing industries 
Production 117.3 140.0 165.9 196.3 228.l 261.9 291.9 245.9 
Employment 104.5 ll2.3 122.0 131.2 139.3 144.8 147.6 149.7 
Labor productivity 112.l 124.7 136.0 149.6 163.8 180.9 197.8 147.7 
Labor cost 98.6 102.2 ll0.4 124.2 152.4 177.l 221.4 274.6 
Industrial raw materials 117.3 128.6 148.5 164.2 158.9 202.9 
Wholesale price index ;' Average annual eamin~ 110.6 127.5 150.l 185.8 249.6 320.6 ::i 
Cost of living index 104.9 lll.5 123.9 143.l 157.3 183.4 !!!. c;· 
Real earnin~ index 105.4 ll4.3 121.l 128.9 158.7 174.8 r "' e: 
Construction '< 
"' Value added at constant prices 107.0 ll7.2 130.4 174.7 239.6 g 
Employment 108.3 118.3 128.3 153.2 147.2 "' 1ll Value added per employee 98.8 99.l 101.6 114.l 162.8 :;· 
Wage index 102.6 120.6 146.7 189.0 278.l 387.7 520.9 613.l ::;' 
Labor cost 103.8 121.7 144.4 165.6 170.8 "' ; Construction materials 98.6 105.5 128.4 164.9 173.4 198.8 249.4 257.3 < 0 
Wholesale price index ![' 
Real wage index 97.8 108.2 118.4 132.1 176.8 211.4 c;· 
"' Skill differential l.026 l.025 l.110 l.065 l.022 l.071 .. ~ 
SoURCE: Plan and Budget Organization, Economic Trends of Iran (Tehran: Bank Markazi Iran, March 1977); Bank Markazi Iran, Annual Report, 1972, ... .. 
1975, 1978. "' 
CJ 
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mining) did not decline in 1975. These patterns suggest that wages and earn-
ings in the selected manufacturing industries were likely to be higher and to 
have increased more rapidly than those in smaller scale enterprises and the 
informal or craft establishments. 
In general, the expansion of wages and earnings in construction and 
(selected) manufacturing industries exceeded the increase in the consumer 
price index throughout this period, resulting in subsequent increases in the 
real wage or earnings indexes. This wa~ especially the case in 1975 when the 
rate of inflation slackened appreciably. These patterns are easy to explain 
given the supply-demand conditions in the country's labor markets. 
A more difficult pattern to account for is the apparent coincidence during 
1975 in both manufacturing and construction sectors of high rates of increase 
in nominal wages and earnings, which occurred simultaneously with the 
reduction in the level of employment in both sectors (though not the selected 
manufacturing industries) and the decline in the rate of inflation in con-
sumer prices. This pattern could be caused through a mechanism of delayed 
wage adjustments under increased government pressure; for instance, the 
Ministry of Labor began compelling firms to pay between two and three 
months' bonus at the end of each year, irrespective of productivity 
increases. 17 Greater insight into the functioning of labor markets is required 
to explain the apparent decline in the skill differential in successive years, 
while construction employment first expanded (in 1974) at an unprec-
edented rate and then declined (in 1975) .18 
Despite these unexplained patterns, it is fairly safe to conclude tentatively 
that wage-cost push pressures did not dominate the inflationary process at 
this time (despite the increasing labor-cost indexes). It is sure that wage in-
creases contribut~9 to the general rise in production costs. Other costs were 
rising equally or more rapidly, however. In the context of this period, it is 
apparent that considerable reserves of unskilled labor existed both in the 
agricultural sector and in the urban work force at the beginning of the 
period. 19 It is hard to see, therefore, how increased labor costs could have 
been anything but one aspect of the heavy demands that oil-financed expen-
ditures placed on all productive resources. There is little evidence to support 
the singling out of labor as a significant contributor to cost-push forces, not 
least because of the absence of strong labor unions. 
In sum, while a case could perhaps be made for the existence of a wage-
cost push mechanism in the manufacturing and construction sectors, it is dif-
ficult to see how, as an empirical matter, this effect could have dominated 
the inflationary process in these sectors, let alone the economy as a whole. 
Infrastructural Bottlenecks 
As noted, a source of structural inflation was created by the lack of excess 
capacity and the generally low levels of efficiency present in most of the 
country's basic infrastructure at the beginning of the boom period. 20 
As a result, the acceleration of output that occurred in both the oil and 
nonoil sectors created an immediate shortage. of available capacity, par-
ticularly in the areas of ports, domestic transportation, and electrical power. 
The country's obsolete port facilities and slow customs-clearance pro-
cedures, both resulting in low productivity, were the most publicized bot-
tlenecks, with inadequacies in port facilities and the transportation system 
also major impediments to increased imports. As an illustration of the 
JnOationary Process in Prerevolutionary Iran 343 
magnitude of port congestion, the recorded rate of utilization of nominal 
cargo-handling capacity increased from 132 percent in 1973 to 185 percent 
in 1974. In that year, Iran was forced to pay over one billion dollars in 
demurrage charges (amounting to more than 15 percent of the value of mer-
chandise imports). 21 
Similarly, electricity-generating capacity fell far short of the new require-
ments placed on it. By the end of 1974, power failures had become common 
in large cities and industrial areas. Consequently, many companies failed to 
achieve anticipated levels of production. Moreover, implementation of the 
development plan for electrical power fell far behind schedule with less than 
two-thirds of the Fifth Plan targets met. By way of comparison with other 
countries of a comparable level of per capita GNP, Iran's 1975 per capita 
electrical production ranked as one of the world's lowest (at 460 kilowatts 
per annum versus a median value of 1,140 kilowatts per annum). 22 
Largely because of shortages linked to the underdevelopment of the na-
tion's infrastructure, Iranian industry was working at about 60 percent of 
capacity in May 1977 (61 percent for textiles, 46 percent in bricks, 96 percent 
in cement, 90 percent in sugar, 51 percent in automobiles, and 32 percent 
for tractors). Blackouts, inadequate transport facilities, and shortages of 
building materials (particularly cement) all contributed to this situation. 23 
Deviations from the Trend as a Measure of Inflationary Pressure 
One measure of the general level of bottlenecks, strains, and ultimately 
structural inflationary forces is the degree of the deviation of production 
from its long-run trend. This approach assumes that short-run deviations of 
output from its long-term trend are an adequate measure of inflationary 
pressure, and that the monetary authorities either cannot or do not 
neutralize the •impact of changes in holdings of foreign exchange on the 
money supply. 24 
As later analysis will show, the second assumption is open to some ques-
tion. For now, however, several formulations of the general type (INF + D 
+ WINF = EXP) are estimated. Here INF is a measure of domestic infla-
tion (usually consumer goods); D is a measure of the deviation of real pro-
duction from its long-run trend; WINF is the rate of increase in world prices; 
and EXP is a measure of price-induced expectations. 
In direct contrast to a quantity-of-money-type price equation (which 
takes Y as given in the short run), this formulation incorporates a growing 
body of literature contending that (at least in the short run) the level of real 
output in developing countries is subject to the influence of domestic policy 
measures (such as money-supply changes). 25 Whereas in a quantity-of-
money equation at a given level of income money-supply changes are the 
measure of excess demand, the above formulation implies that shifts in 
money supply will affect prices only if they cause output to rise above its 
long-term trend. 
Obviously the major empirical issue surrounding this approach is the 
ability of D to serve as an effective measure of excess demand. If D does not 
properly account for this factor, and beciuse the various determinants of 
inflation tend to some degree to rise together, an undue share of the varia-
tion of the prices of home goods may be attributed to import prices and the 
lagged price changes used in the expectations variable. 
With these caveats in mind, I ran a number of regressions of the above 
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general form. As with the test of the openness inflation theory, regressions on 
the rate of increase in the consumer price index gave somewhat better (but 
again similar) results compared with the wholesale price index. 
Again, because the literature is not precise as to the best aggregate income 
measure to use in deviations from the trend analysis, several different in-
come series were tested. Two time periods were also used for computing the 
trend: 1959-1977 and 1959-1972. Logarithmic forms were estimated along 
with the regular formulation. Measures of D were: real nonoil GDP, 
logarithmic form (DDLNOXNP); rehl domestic absorption (DTDNANP); 
real nonoil GDP (DTNOXNP); and real gross domestic product 
(DTGDPNP). Lagged values end with an L 
As mig!:it be expected, deviations from the .1959-1972 trend (extrapolated 
to 1977) gave better results than those from the 1959-1977 trend. By itself the 
best measure of the deviation from the trend was real nonoil GDP (DTNOX-
NP), with its current period value accounting for over 81 percent of the fluc-
tuation in the consumer price index, and its lagged value accounting for 
nearly 85 percent of the fluctuation (see table 5). 
Using the lagged value of deviations from the trend (1959-1972), real 
nonoil GDP gave excellent results, with r 2 values all above 0.90 percent, and 
one form with openness and world inflation (see equation 12, table 6) ac-
counting for nearly 98 percent of the fluctuation in the rate of consumer 
price inflation (INFC). As noted in the discussion of openness and inflation, 
all measures of openness were quite significant when regressed with 
DTNOXPL, and hence for comparison purposes only two of these are given 
here (see equations 5, 10, and 11, table 6). Again, the rate of world inflation 
(WINF) is significant when regressed with DTNOXPL as is the growth in M2 
and Ml measures of money (see especially GMlL and GM2L, equations 6 
and 7, table 6). While these results seem quite satisfactory, several concep-
tual difficulties detract somewhat from their acceptance as an accurate 
depiction of the inflationary process in Iran during this period. In general, at 
least three characteristics of the lrania·n economy might limit the effec-
tiveness of DTNOXPL as a measure of excess demand: the high proportion of 
agricultural products in both nonoil production and consumption, a fairly 
high rate of inflation, and an uneven growth of productive capacity. 
Implicit in the use of DTNOXPL as a measure of excess demand in the 
inflation equations is the notion that when the growth of output rose above 
its Jong-run trend the country's domestic productive capacity was being 
strained and that prices had to rise if output was to be increased any further. 
Clearly, this assumption is predicated on the existence of an upward-sloping 
supply curve of output, whereby rising prices stimulate further production. 
This situation is undoubtedly better suited for conditions present in the more 
advanced economies where gross domestic product has a much higher pro-
portion of industrial products. In general, there should be more scope for ex-
panding the output of manufacturing and services in the short run than 
would be the case for agricultural products, particularly as in Iran where 
most products were subject to a crop cycle or weather conditions. Even 
though import-substitution industrialization was proceeding rapidly, Iran's 
nonoil GDP was still heavily concentrated on agricultural products in the 
early 1970s. Given the rapid expansion in the consumption of food during 
this period, agriculture's output was probably more subject to fluctuations in 
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TABLE 6 
~ 
"' IRAN: DEVIATIONS FROM THE TREND AND CoNSUMER PRICE INFLATION 
(1959-1977) :>:I 0 
DEPENDENT INoEPENqENT VARIABLES 
[ 
E'.QuATION VARIABLE DTNOXPL INTERCEPT ,. F t'1 CM2 WINF CM2L .INFCL z CM2C2 CMIL TrCL WINFU ZL r 
(1) INFC 0.038 -0.05 4.76 0 0 
" (9.37) ( -1.09) (4.01) 0.901 50.10 "' '< 
(2) INFC 0.036 0.31 1.90 
(11.88) (3.38) (2.42) .950 94.06 
(3) INFC 0.033 -0.08 0.33 3.71 
(12.40) (-2.71) (4.21) (4.71) .964 90.22 
(4) INFC 0.048 0.41 -0.57 3.54 
(10.29) (4.83) (-3.00) (5.04) .968 99.18 
(5) INFC 0.052 0.35 -10.14 5.12 
(6.60) (3.95) (-2.17) (3.58) .958 75.92 
(6) .INFC 0.015 0.17 0.42 0.10 -5.59 
(1.27) (1.59) (1.93) (0.67) ( - 1.19) .956 49.21 
(7) INFC 0.024 0.32 -0.51 
(4.50) (3.32) (-0.36) .945 95.03 
(8) INFC 0.039 3.62 
(9.53) (4.34) .892 90.86 
(9) INFC 0.047 0.0036 -13.19 
(8.61) (1.91) ( -1.48) .918 61.31 
(IO) INFC 0.60 -10.14 3.44 
(l.88) (-2.16) (1.20) .237 3.41 
(11) INFC 0.077 0.35 -32.58 11.11 
(10.62) (2.27) (-5.06) (7.87) .973 119.92 
(12) INFC 0.022 0.023 0.31 0.02 
(2.32) (2.16) (1.48) (2.32) 0.959 70.94 
NOTE: See text for identification of symbols. 
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deviations of agricultural production above its trend could result in lower 
rather than higher prices and vice versa, thus distorting the measure of ex-
cess demand that the overall deviation from the trend figure was attempting 
to capture. 
A second limitation on the usefulness of DTNOXPL as a measure of excess 
demand is its implicit assumption that production grows at a fairly constant 
rate. While investment fluctuates from year to year in most advanced coun-
tries, Iran's investment in both construction and machinery seems to have 
been especially volatile by any standards. Whether these fluctuations in 
capacity are high enough to invalidate the DTNOXPL measure of excess 
demand is difficult to assess. They do, however, cast serious doubts on the 
procedure. 
Finally, applicability of DTNOXPL as an accurate measure of demand 
pressure in Iran is also questionable because of the country's high rates of in-
flation and money-supply growth, particularly in the 1970s. Within a 
limited range, changes in short-run demand pressure could have resulted 
partially in higher industrial output and partially in price increases. Never-
theless, a point may have been realized in the early 1970s beyond which an 
increase in demand resulted in higher prices only. The high rates of money-
supply growth combined with a high proportion of output in agriculture 
may have been sufficient to have significantly reduced the economy's short-
run supply elasticity. 
Conclusion 
Taken in their entirety, the empirical results presented above cast doubt 
on the role of pure cost-push factors as a significant contributing factor to 
the Iranian inflation of the 1970s. Admittedly, these may have been present 
in certaiQ industries and at certain times, but their overall impact seems to 
have been minimal. 
Ultimately, the issue comes down to the fact that the tests outlined above 
using proxies for structural factors, while statistically satisfactory, suffer 
from conceptual difficulties. Specifically, many of the underlying assump-
tions critical for the validity of the deviation from the trend measure may 
not have been present in Iran during the time examined. The real issue is 
whether or not, despite the limitations of these theories, the quantity-of-
money approach (or a version of it), given the availability of direct data for 
its testing, might not better reflect the relative inflationary impact of exter-
nal versus domestic factors. 
Monetary elements also warrant more attention simply because, in tests 
with structural factors (see equation 6, table 6), the growth in money supply 
was statistically significant while the structural proxy (DTNOXPL) was not. 
This fact is important because in responding to inflation the government ap-
pears to have implicitly accepted the argument that its underlying causes 
were cost related and not of monetary origins. 
In terms of designing an anti-inflationary policy, it is useful to distinguish 
between one-shot events that lead to a once-and-for-all rise in the price level 
and those processes that are cumulati~e in the sense of leading to continuing 
and perhaps accelerating rates of inflation. The different types of inflation 
must be validated by monetary expansion, but the costs and possible success 
of particular anti-inflationary monetary and fiscal policies will be different 
in each case. For example, since the inflation in Iran appears to have 
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resulted primarily from excess demand, it could have been reduced more 
easily with the traditional tools of monetary and fiscal policy than if it had 
originated from cost-related factors. The cost of reducing the demand com-
ponent of inflation must be measured in terms of the resulting level of tem-
porary unemployment and diminished rate of growth in real nonoil GP. 
Apparently the government felt this particular rise in prices after 1973 was 
a once-and-for-all cost related phenomenon. If this were the case, one might 
easily argue, as did many in the government, that oil-financed government 
expenditures would not continue increasing at a rate sufficient to generate 
chronic inflationary pressures. Given the potential costs of stabilization 
policy early after 1973, it is easy to understand the government's rationale 
against adopting an all out restrictive monetary-fiscal anti-inflationary 
policy. 
Again in retrospect, the government's interpretation of the manner in 
which the economy functioned was incorrect. While it is true that the oil-
price increase could be looked upon as a once-and-for-all event, it does not 
follow that the economy was incapable over time of generating sufficient 
demand pressure to prevent a process of automatic stabilization from 
occurring. 
Because inflationary forces did not self-terminate, and because in the 
government's perception cost factors were responsible for the continued rate 
of price increase, a 1975 antiprofiteering campaign was undertaken, during 
which more than 250,000 businesses were briefly closed, over 8,000 shop-
keepers were jailed, and another 23,00(J shopkeepers and merchants were 
sentenced to deportation (later rescinded) to remote areas of the country. 
By 1977, declining oil revenues forced the government to cut back 
drastically on expenditures and credit while inflation was still out of control. 
The result was mass alienation. The construction industry, a major source of 
employment for unskilled rural labor, underwent a severe contraction. 
Rural migrants as a whole suffered the greatest decline in living standards 
because of inflation, food shortages, and the need to use a large portion of 
their income for rents. The bazaar merchants, dependent on state credits to 
finance many of their activities and thereby affected by inflation, came to 
feel their economic role in society increasingly threatened by the regime's 
development strategy, a strategy that was perceived by them as openly 
hostile and designed to reduce their upward social mobility. Small indus-
trialists joined by the merchants expressed their opposition to price controls; 
antiprofiteering campaigns and a plethora of government decrees placed 
limits on their incomes and stifled any possibilities they might have for 
socioeconomic advancement. 
Again to quote Green: 
The rapid desertion of the Shah by members of the elite attests to the shallow commitment 
engendered by his emphasis on economic gain at the expense of political rights. This harks back 
to the Shah's response to the Siahkal incident-pay raises for government employees and an in-
creased minimum wage. Just as the source of political stability was perceived to be economic 
growth the palliative sought by the regime for oppositional activity was economic as well. Cer-
tainly as I have argued above, economic issues such as inflation and the decline in the quality of 
life in Iran were important stimuli to revolution, but their significance lay in their linkage to a 
perceived absence by Iranians of justice and social participation.20 
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